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Covid-19, Knowledge Production and the (Un)Making of
Truths and Fakes
George Ogola
School of Arts and Media, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
ABSTRACT
The Covid-19 pandemic is one of the most disruptive phenomena
of our time. It has threatened and destabilised the normative, it
has stoked fear and anxiety, and laid bare the fragility of our
systems of governance, medical science and the immanent
tensions within our knowledge systems. The pandemic has
provoked a fundamental collision of these systems, leaving in its
wake confusion as we struggle over meaning; the production of
meaning, its husbandry and political instrumentalisation as a tool
for domination and resistance. This article explores the emerging
reconfiguration of the certainty about what is authentic or the
truth, and of the un/certainty of the fake and fakery as alternative
or complementary sites of truth(s). It argues that we are now
faced with a complex and layered contestation over who gets to
define the truth and the fake, and under what terms. This
conversation is deeply insurrectional for it invites the whole
world, centres and margins alike, to confront how political,
cultural, economic and social values and structures of knowledge
production are implicated in the making and unmaking of the
authentic, of truth as well as of the fake.
KEYWORDS
Covid-19; fake news; social
media; Africa; knowledge
production
In March 2020, a screengrab of an alleged CCN news “report” featuring the famous news
anchor Wolf Blitzer, with the chyron “alcohol kills Corona virus”, was widely shared on
Facebook in Kenya. The post encouraged people to tag fellow “walevi” (Kiswahili for drun-
kards) to drink alcohol as protection against the virus. In Namibia, elephant dung was
touted on various social media as a cure for Coronavirus, while in South Africa, posts
about free Coronavirus grants, incorrect school re-opening dates, Chinese nationals alleg-
edly buying their way into the country and many other such fabricated stories featured
under the Twitter hashtag #coronaVirusSA.
Around the world, these kinds of posts, part of what is now commonly known as “fake
news”, quickly gained the attention of governments as the World Health Organization
(WHO) warned against the scourge of “infodemics” or the overabundance of false
stories making it difficult for people to make sense of the Covid-19 pandemic. For
various reasons, including the alleged impact of “infodemics” but in some cases primarily
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political, countries such as South Africa, Russia, India, Turkey and China passed Covid-
related legislation.
The nature of the Covid-related false stories and the manner in which they are pro-
duced, circulated and consumed point to a range of explanatory incentives: commercial,
political, cultural and ideological. It is thus arguable that a focus solely on the impact of
“fake news”, usually singular and pre-determined, detracts from the need to also explain
and understand the motivations behind and logics of the production and consumption of
these stories.
Against the background of the Covid-19 pandemic in Africa, this article seeks to reflect
on some of the incentives and logics that make “fake news” assume discursive signifi-
cance in contemporary conversations on “truth(s)”. The discussion finds particularly
useful Farkas and Schou’s (2018) proposition that in order to make sense of “fake
news”, we should be concerned about what the proliferation of “fake news” signifiers
actually signify; “[W]hat kinds of ethico-normative struggles do they bring to the fore-
ground?” (298).
Understanding “Fake News”
There is a disturbing generality to the many attempts to define “fake news”. While it nom-
inally refers to “fabricated information that is patently false” (Molina et al. 2021, 180), it is
much more. “Fake news”may constitute “false news, polarized content, satire, and misre-
porting” (ibid.). The term was especially popularised by former US President Donald
Trump, but has a much longer history – especially in the Deep South in the United
States (Zeitz 2017). Fake news and its constitutive variants, misinformation and disinfor-
mation, now dominate our everyday conversations. Current challenges and anxieties,
Zeitz argues, have made our world surprisingly habitable to this new regime of infor-
mation (2017).
Adopting Farkas and Schou’s (2018) proposition, this discussion attempts to disambig-
uate the generality that has attended our definition and understanding of “fake news”. Of
relevance perhaps is Beckett’s (2017) description of “fake news” as “the canary in the
digital coal mine” (1). He calls it “a symptom of a much wider systemic challenge
around the value and credibility of information and the way that we – socially, politically,
economically – are going to handle the threats and opportunities of new communication
technologies” (Beckett 2017). While Beckett provides a useful lens with which to unpack
this phenomenon of “fake news”, by focusing primarily on the digital, agency is unnecess-
arily given to technology, which is merely facilitating its production and circulation albeit
rather rapidly compared to other platforms. What is however significant in Beckett’s con-
tribution here is the notion of value; the right to define meaning and the discursive power
of that meaning. This may very well help us understand the logics of its proliferation.
Within the context of the media, Beckett argues that the proliferation of “fake news” is
“indicative of a wider shift towards a more decentralised media ecology where insurgent
sources can have more impact than in the past” (2). This is an important observation for it
raises questions around inclusion and exclusion in information ecologies. What drives
these “insurgent sources” and what is the nature of the “insurgency”? Could it be that
this insurgency speaks as well as responds to exclusion and to the desire or need to
claim space in the frontiers of defining meaning or in knowledge production?
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News organisations have traditionally relied on a dated typology of news values (Van
Ginneken 1998) which in practice has institutionalised exclusionary newsroom practices
and the development of a highly problematic assumption about what constitutes
news, and therefore value. Suffice to say that news typically wears the face of structural
privilege. Race/ethnicity, class and gender all matter. The Other is currently at war with
this privilege and the problematic structures of domination. The Centre and the Other
are both instrumentalising “fake news” politically in a hegemonic struggle over the
right to define the normative. There is, as Beckett points out, “a commercial and techno-
logical context to fake news, but ultimately it is a political issue” (2).
Developing the idea that fake news is fundamentally a political issue, Farkas and Schou
(2018) argue that “what fake news stands for… is something larger than the term itself: a
fundamental shift in political and public attitudes to what journalism and news represent
and how facts and information may be obtained in a digitalized world” (300). They argue
that fake news “has become an important component in contemporary political
struggles” and demonstrate how it is “utilised by different positions within the social
space as means of discrediting, attacking and delegitimising political opponents”
(Farkas and Schou 2018, 300). Drawing on the work of the philosopher Laclau, they
argue that “fake news” “has become a ‘floating signifier’: a signifier lodged in-between
different hegemonic projects seeking to provide an image of how society is and ought
to be structured” (301).
As a floating signifier “fake news” is thus
… used by fundamentally different and in many ways deeply opposing political projects as a
means of constructing political identities, conflicts and antagonisms. Instilled with different
meanings, “fake news” becomes part of a much larger hegemonic struggle to define the
shape, purpose and modalities of contemporary politics. It becomes a key moment in a pol-
itical power struggle between hegemonic projects. In this way, we argue that “fake news” has
become a deeply political concept used to delegitimise political opponents and construct
hegemony. (Farkas and Schou 2018)
In their article discussing fake news as “a floating signifier” Farkas and Schou find it par-
ticularly profitable to examine “fake news” “as a discursive signifier that is part of political
struggles”, and they look at how “different conceptions of fake news serve to produce and
articulate political battlegrounds over social reality” (Farkas and Schou 2018).
The Covid-19 Pandemic and the Hierarchies of Knowledge Production
The Covid-19 pandemic is one of the most disruptive phenomena of our time. It has threa-
tened and destabilised the normative, stoked fear and anxiety, and laid bare the fragility
of our systems of governance, medical science and the immanent tensions within our
knowledge systems. The pandemic has provoked a fundamental collision of these
systems, leaving in its wake confusion as we struggle over meaning, the production of
meaning, its husbandry and political instrumentalisation as a tool for both domination
and resistance.
Due in part to the Covid-19 pandemic, there is an emerging reconfiguration of the cer-
tainty about the authentic or truth, and of the un/certainty of the fake and fakery as
alternative and or complementary sites of truth(s). We are presently confronted with a
complex and layered contestation over who gets to define the truth and the fake, and
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under what terms. It is a deeply insurrectional conversation for it invites the whole world,
centres and margins alike, to confront how political, cultural, economic and social values,
structures and infrastructures of knowledge production, are implicated in the making and
unmaking of truth and the fake.
I foreground some of the struggles attending the current conversation around Covid-
19 and fake news and focus on some illustrative examples as sites through which these
struggles over truth, the normative and meaning are made visible. I demonstrate how
information/knowledge is mobilised and instrumentalised in a hegemonic struggle
over meaning, and ultimately of the right to dominate and of the resistance against
being dominated.
In the news media, the Covid-19 pandemic appears to have produced a discursive
regime of differentiation and or categorisation of knowledges and therefore of news
and “fake news”. It has reified the primacy and legitimacy of Western scientific knowledge
as truth and alternatives as manifestly “not truth” and therefore, by default, fake. In Africa,
the Covid-19 pandemic has led to fears of an “infodemic”. Fundamentally, it is assumed
this threatens faith in medical scientific knowledge, the dangers of which are said to be
incalculable. Africa’s relatively successful containment of the pandemic, not necessarily
through any specific “scientific models”, is still notably suppressed. Instead, the focus
has been on the continent’s vulnerability to fake news and of the need therefore to
fight “infodemics” and to stress the urgency of restoring faith in the unquestionable legiti-
macy of Western medical scientific “truths”.
But the legitimacy of medical scientific “truth”, particularly within the context of
Western medicine, has always been tenuous in Africa. Legacies of “epidemiological and
bodily harms caused by [colonial] conquest” (Tilley 2016) remain lodged in the continent’s
popular consciousness. There were innumerable instances of “ethical… transgressions of
colonial research and treatment campaigns” in Africa that still feed deep anxieties about
Western medicine across the continent. Tilley reminds us of comments made by the Uni-
versity of Oxford senior physician Honor Smith, as recently as the 1950s, that Africa offers
an “almost unlimited field… for clinical research that I find so enthralling… problems of
the first interest abound, [and] clinical material is unlimited” (28). Smith’s exuberance, she
says, tells us just how Africans were treated as “unproblematic research subjects, with few
topics off limits” (Tilley 2016, 28). In addition, Tilley notes that in the colonial period there
were “concerted and inadvertent efforts to undermine African healing practices, which
was not always commensurable with introduced medical techniques” (Tilley 2016, 28).
More recently, there have been cases of deliberate medical malpractices that have
targeted black populations in the continent by rogue white doctors. In South Africa, for
example, Dr Wouter Basson, nicknamed “Dr Death” in the South African press, was
allegedly involved in the killing of hundreds of black people in South Africa and
Namibia through a cocktail of drugs and biological agents. Basson was head of
“Project Coast”, South Africa’s chemical and biological weapons unit under apartheid
(Washington 2007). In 1995, a Scottish anaesthesiologist was accused of five murders
and convicted for the deaths of two infants he injected with lethal doses of morphine
in Zimbabwe. In another case in 2000, Werber Bezwoda, a cancer researcher at the Uni-
versity of Witwatersrand, was fired following a medical experiment involving very high
doses of chemotherapy followed by bone marrow transplants on black breast cancer
patients. These examples, disparate though they are, help construct and legitimise a
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racialised narrative of suspicion around which local populations can easily be
mobilised.
The response to WHO’s advice on the need to remain faithful to science has therefore
been variable. It has ranged from total acceptance of the universalised WHO-sanctioned
narratives (Ogola 2020), to reluctant acceptance, to outright rejection. Importantly,
however, legitimate news on the pandemic has been largely framed within the context
of Western scientific “truth”, in effect mobilising existing and historical anti-Western senti-
ment across political, commercial, cultural and social interests. The historical and struc-
tural marginalisation of particular geographies, cultures and people in the making of
that which has been normalised as the legitimate “truth” has animated the creation of
alternative “truths”, some of which take the form of “fake news”. Fuelled by a resurgent
nationalism, different constituencies and interests have mobilised both political and cul-
tural capital to construct their own “truths”. Precisely because the normative remains
singularly defined, these alternatives are denied legitimacy through their characterisation
as “fake news”.
Madagascar and Tanzania’s responses to the Covid-19 pandemic stand out fundamen-
tally for their rejection of Western scientific “truth”. They are as a consequence simul-
taneously framed as pariah states and as brave outposts standing up to new forms of
imperialism clothed in science. Under the leadership of President John Magufuli, who
passed away in March 2021 from heart complications, Tanzania stopped regular testing
of Covid-19 in May 2020. It was however widely rumoured that the president had died
of Covid-19 with many citing the secrecy with which his ill-health was handled. Since
May 2020, Magufuli’s government refused to reveal any data on Covid-19 infection
rates and did not shut down its economy even when neighbouring countries did so.
The government instead adopted an alternative religious narrative through which to
interpret and respond to the pandemic. While the coercive nature of the Magufuli-state
may have demanded the adoption of this narrative, media and public reaction to this nar-
rative was not been entirely oppositional. The government’s position did have some
public support, both in Tanzania and across the continent. Yet this is not necessarily a
case of religious “truth” triumphing over medical science. One would argue that the
public acceptance of religion as a site of alternative truth speaks to broader processes
of structural exclusion from the hierarchies of knowledge production of scientific
“truth”. This was possibly an attempt to develop a different regime of truth in which
the hierarchy of knowledge was inverted.
Magufuli tapped into a resurgent nationalism that has gripped the world over the last
five years. It is a nationalism that seeks attention in many forms: politically, culturally and
economically. Drawing on prevailing nationalist sentiment, Magufuli excavated anti-
Western rhetoric usually justified by the resilience of the vestiges of the colonial enter-
prise, explained mainly through the lense of continued economic and political margina-
lisation of the continent. He framed his response to the pandemic as a revolutionary
confrontation with neo-imperialism. As such, the WHO-sanctioned interventions, includ-
ing social distancing and the wearing of masks, were framed as forms of economic, pol-
itical and intellectual control, even sabotage, that had to be rejected.
This nationalism and its centrality in the struggle over meaning can however also be
seen in the international race towards the discovery of a Covid-19 vaccine. AstraZeneca,
Moderna, Pfizer and BioNtech, the leading companies that developed the Covid-19
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vaccines, were proxies for a nationalist contest between the UK, the US, and Germany in
the West, and Russia and China in the East. Being the first to come up with the vaccine was
invested with significant political meaning. Meanwhile, employing patronage as public
diplomacy, Russia and China offered free and discounted vaccines to the developing
world as leverage to expand their influence. Only days after announcing the success of
the Sputnik V vaccine, the Russian Trade Ministry, for example, claimed to have received
expressions of interest from more than 20 countries for more than a billion doses of their
vaccine. China on the other hand offered enticements, including a reported $1 billion loan
programme to help Latin American and Caribbean countries to purchase its vaccines
(Baumgaertner and McDonnell 2020).
In Madagascar, President Andry Rajoelina pleaded for the recognition of Africa’s indi-
genous knowledge systems when he claimed that the herbal tonic Covid Organics was
effective in the treatment of Covid-19. WHO however quickly warned against the use
of medicines that had not undergone clinical trials. In effect the alleged success of
Covid Organics was framed as a case of misinformation, part of the very dangerous
scourge of the infodemic that had to be addressed. Rajoelina argued that, had this
tonic been produced in a Western country, the reaction in the West would have been
different. Such suspicions are not entirely invalid. In September 2020, the leading
medical journal The Lancet had to withdraw a peer-reviewed study on the use of hydro-
xychloroquine as a treatment for Covid-19. The large observational study relied on a
dataset by a data analytics company that was apparently founded by one of the
authors of the paper. The data used for the study varied with official government and
health department data from a number of countries cited in the article. The study
forced WHO to suspend temporarily the use of hydrochloroquine in the treatment of
Covid-19. However, this was not regarded as a case of misinformation but rather as an
unfortunate lapse in editorial gatekeeping, a privilege not extended to “knowledge” gen-
erated from the global South.
Conclusion
The discussion of “fake news”, while rightly focused on impact, must not ignore what its
presence and proliferation signify. Ultimately it is indicative of the contestations and
struggles over the legitimacies of knowledge and meaning. Western scientific knowledge
and its apparatuses of dissemination, such as the news media, have continued to repro-
duce hierarchies of knowledge/information, prompting a revolt manifested now most
starkly in multiple narrative insurrections, some of which take the form of “fake news”.
The mainstreaming of “fake news” and of alternative versions of “truth” must not necess-
arily be seen as a triumph of a post-truth dispensation. Instead they should be understood
as part of an ongoing struggle over meaning and as evidence of the contestations of the
hierarchies and infrastructures of hegemonic knowledge production.
The palpable concern about the intellectual wreckage “fake news” will cause in the
global South underlines the power asymmetries that shape global narratives. The focus
on vulnerability and gullibility, particularly of the Southern audience, disregards their
agency to reconfigure truth centred in the West and to attach to it a different value,
one that responds to its local contextual contingencies. It further ignores the South’s
ability to construct an alternative regime of truth. For example, in Africa as in many
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parts of the global South, narratives around pandemics are often quickly appropriated
into popular culture where they are repurposed to perform other roles. “Fake news”
can therefore be deliberately fabricated and instrumentalised to become a fulcrum
around which a range of quite important political and social issues on and beyond the
pandemic are discussed. This way it speaks to broader but also immediate structures of
exclusion and domination, creating spaces for the development of alternative regimes
of truth.
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